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Last year the Department of Trade & Industry
blocked BSkyB's bid for Manchester United
following an MMC investigation. In this article
we explain how game theory proved
instrumental in reaching this decision.
Although BSkyB claimed that it would not have
gained any advantages in negotiations for
Premier League broadcasting rights from its
acquisition of Manchester United, the
economic theory of ‘toehold effects’
demonstrated that this was untrue. It also
explains why the subsequent scramble to
obtain smaller’toeholds’ since the MMC
decision is likely to prove an equally effective
strategy for media interests wishing to gain
influence in Premier League rights selling
decisions.
Introduction
On March 12th last year the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission sent the results of its
extensive investigation into the proposed takeover
of Manchester United by British Sky
Broadcasting to the Trade and Industry Secretary.
As we now know, the MMC’s conclusion was a
resounding no, based on careful arguments
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concerning the advantages BSkyB would obtain in
negotiating future deals for Premier League
broadcasting rights, and the effects this would have
on competition between downstream broadcasters.2
BSkyB has meanwhile loudly protested its
innocence. It claims that as owner of Manchester
United it would not have gained any advantages in
future sales of Premier League rights. It also
protests that it was willing, in any case, to accept
conditions sufficient to guarantee this.
So should the merger have been waved through
after all? Game-theoretic arguments, based on the
theory of ‘toehold effects’ in auctions, explain
why no conditions on Manchester United’s
participation in the selling of Premier League
broadcasting rights could have alleviated the
MMC’s concerns on this score.
Football Cartels
To understand the competition concerns raised by
the proposed take-over, it is important to know
something about the economics of pay television,
and of live sports broadcasting in particular. First,
football matches played by the top Premier
League clubs are amongst the most commercially
important for pay television companies. They
attract huge audiences. In 1997 over 90% of all
BSkyB subscribers took its Sports Channel, on
which Premier League fixtures are shown. In the
same year 25 of the top 30 programmes on
satellite television were league football games.
The industry perception is that sports
broadcasting, and especially Premier League
football, drives their subscriptions.  Ownership of
the rights to broadcast live Premier league
matches would appear to confer a huge
competitive advantage on a broadcaster. No pay
TV company can survive without access to these
games.
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Secondly, the FA Premier League sells the
exclusive rights to all of the games it allows to be
screened as a single package to a downstream
broadcaster. If you want to broadcast any single
match you must therefore acquire the rights to all
of the matches. Once you have acquired the rights
you are free to sell them on to your own
customers, and to rival broadcasters, under any
terms you choose. The FA Premier League, in
other words, acts as a tight cartel. It sells the
rights to 60 of its 380 matches to the highest
bidder in periodic auctions.
BSkyB has held these exclusive rights since they
were first sold in 1992. But how fair were the
auctions for Premier League rights which BSkyB
won in 1992 and 1996?
Auctions for Rights
In 1992 there were two bidders, ITV and BSkyB.
BSkyB won the rights, however not before it was
reportedly given an opportunity to submit a final
bid after learning the value of ITV’s bid. There
were naturally complaints from ITV that it too
should have been given an opportunity to revise
its bid.3
The 1992 contract between BSkyB and the
Premier League contained a ‘meet the
competition’ clause in favour of BSkyB. This
allowed BSkyB to match, or improve upon, the
bid of any competitor in the 1996 auction. A
‘meet the competition’ clause is a huge advantage
for a buyer in any selling procedure. It presents all
other potential bidders with an aggravated form of
what economists call “the Winners’ Curse.” The
Winners’ Curse occurs when a bidder in an
auction has an overly optimistic estimate of the
value of the object being sold, and consequently
outbids all other rivals. But the very fact of
winning should tell him that all the other bidders
placed a lower value on the object being sold, and
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hence that he must have overbid. Faced with a
bidder who will always be given an opportunity
to match your bid, you cannot possibly win an
auction at a price which the other bidder would
find it profitable to pay. Winning will then indeed
be a ‘curse’, and it is something of a mystery why
anyone bothered to bid against BSkyB in the
1996 auction at all.
This brings us back to the question at the heart of
the recent MMC inquiry. Why should BSkyB
have wished to acquire Manchester United? There
was one obvious answer. FA Premier League
rights are due to be auctioned again in 2001,
unless the Restrictive Trade Practices Court rules
this practice illegal. In this auction, BSkyB no
longer has a ‘meet the competition’ clause, and
new competitors have entered the pay TV market
who might well be interested in bidding for these
rights. BSkyB therefore risks losing the exclusive
football broadcasting rights which have been the
key to its success in the pay TV market.
Toeholds and Takeovers
How would the purchase of Manchester United
have helped BSkyB? Game theory explains why
using the idea of ‘‘toehold’’ effects. A “toehold”
is a small asymmetry between the bidders in an
auction, such as one bidder acquiring an
ownership stake in the object being sold.
Toeholds work by ‘multiplying up’ the effects of
the Winners’ Curse for the rival bidders. There is
strong evidence that acquiring a toehold - even a
very small one - can confer a huge competitive
advantage on a bidder in an auction. An analysis
of data from 1353 tender offer contests between
1971 and 1990 in the United States found that
toeholds increase the likelihood of a single bidder
contest, and that bidders without a toehold are less
likely to revise their bids upwards after the initial
round of bidding.4 This empirical evidence is
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backed up by theory.5 In standard auction formats
a bidder with a toehold is virtually guaranteed to
win the auction, and at a lower price than it
otherwise might have paid. When more than one
bidder has a toehold, the bidder with the larger
toehold retains a significant advantage. Having
the second largest toehold is not much better than
having no toehold at all!
Under Premier League revenue sharing rules,
Manchester United receives about 8% of the
revenues from the sale of live football
broadcasting rights. Since Manchester United is
the league’s most successful team, this revenue
share is larger, on average, than that received by
any other team. If you want to obtain a toehold in
Premier League live broadcasting rights, without
finding your advantage nullified by another
broadcaster purchasing a different team,
Manchester United is the team to buy. Once
BSkyB owned Manchester United, the club’s
revenue share in the Premier League would have
accrued to BSkyB, giving BSkyB a commanding
toehold in Premier League broadcasting rights.
How does a toehold ‘multiply up’ the Winners’
Curse? The answer is remarkably simple. A
bidder with a toehold is willing to bid a little more
aggressively than otherwise because part of its bid
will come back to it by virtue of its ownership
stake. This has the effect of aggravating the
winners’ curse faced by the other bidders, who
will then bid a little more conservatively. This
allows the bidder with the toehold to bid more
aggressively still, and so on.
BSkyB’s ownership of Manchester United would
have conferred a major advantage in future
auctions for Premier League rights, provided that
collective and exclusive selling continues. And
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this toehold advantage could not have been
alleviated by prohibiting Manchester United from
participating in Premier League decisions. It was
argued by the parties however, that BSkyB’s
toehold advantage could be reduced if the Premier
League were to hold a sealed bid auction. It was
also suggested that the Premier League would
have every incentive to do this in order to
maximise its own revenues.
These arguments were at best naïve, and at worst
disingenuous, however. As the MMC recognised,
maintaining a commitment to hold a sealed bid
auction can be problematic in the face of perfectly
legal inducements to accept higher subsequent
offers. They were unconvinced that the Premier
League would be able to abide by such a
commitment. Critics of the toehold argument also
underestimated the variety of ways in which
advantages can be conferred, or small
asymmetries created, in auctions. Information on
rivals’ bids can be (and has been) leaked.  And we
should not forget that BSkyB managed to obtain
very significant advantages for itself in both of
the previous rights auctions, even when it did not
own Manchester United. Why should we expect
this ability to be diminished once it owned the
Premier League’s most valuable football club?
What if the Premier League cartel is abolished
and the clubs forced to sell their broadcasting
rights individually? It would have been perilous
to make precise predictions. However the MMC
concluded that ownership of England’s most
popular and successful football club would have
undoubtedly left BSkyB extremely well-placed to
negotiate for exclusive broadcasting rights to the
important matches with other clubs.
After the Decision: The Battle for
Toeholds
In light of the MMC’s decision, NTL dropped it’s
bid for Newcastle United after being referred by
the Trade and Industry Secretary to the (renamed)
Competition Commission. This was despite theHARBORD AND BINMORE:  TOEHOLDS, TAKEOVERS AND FOOTBALL
[2000] EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW, VOL. 21, ISSUE 2
fact that NTL did not hold anything like BSkyB’s
pre-eminent position in the market for pay TV
sports broadcasting and hence was never in a
strong position to exploit any advantages it might
thereby gain at the expense of its competitors. As
the MMC observed, BSkyB retains significant
incumbency advantages in the competition to
obtain football broadcasting rights, which it may
be difficult for other broadcasters to overcome.
Media and pay TV companies appear to view the
MMC decision as implying that no football club
should ever be owned by any broadcasting
company. The decison was clearly based
however, on BSkyB’s pre-existing monopoly
position in the sports broadcasting market, and on
the influence that the acquisition of Manchester
United would buy BSkyB in future rights
negotiations. Bids by other companies for other
football clubs will have to be considered on their
merits.
Since the MMC decision however, broadcasters
have hit upon a different, although potentially
equally effective strategy for gaining influence
over rights selling decisions. Recognising that lots
of little toeholds may well be as useful as one big
one, the scramble is now on to obtain stakes in as
many football clubs as possible. BSkyB has
retained its shareholding in Manchester United
and in August signed a media alliance with Leeds
United which resulted in it taking a 9% stake in
the club for £13.8 million. BSkyB also recently
acquired 5% of  Sunderland football club and
9.9% of Manchester City.6 Similarly, NTL has
increased its stake in Newcastle United to 9.8%
and is now in talks with Aston Villa with a view
to clinching a similar deal. Meanwhile, in July,
Granada paid £22 million for a 9.9% stake in
Liverpool FC. According to the press reports:
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“Following the Department of Trade & Industry's
decision to block BSkyB's bid for Manchester
United, media groups have been looking for other
ways to gain an influence at Premier League
clubs. Broadcasters see holding a stake in major
clubs as a way to gain influence in future rights
negogiations … and  are jockeying  for position to
secure the next wave of television rights for
football, which has been a major weapon in the
pay TV market in the UK.”
None of this activity is likely to trigger
intervention from any regulatory body, although
the net result may well to distort the sale of
football television rights as much as a wholesale
takeover of Manchester United by BskyB would
have done.